Humanitarian Logistics: Shipping Designs for the Post Disaster Cargo Surge by Green, Nicholas L.
Air Force Institute of Technology
AFIT Scholar
Theses and Dissertations Student Graduate Works
3-21-2019
Humanitarian Logistics: Shipping Designs for the
Post Disaster Cargo Surge
Nicholas L. Green
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.afit.edu/etd
Part of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Graduate Works at AFIT Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AFIT Scholar. For more information, please contact richard.mansfield@afit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Green, Nicholas L., "Humanitarian Logistics: Shipping Designs for the Post Disaster Cargo Surge" (2019). Theses and Dissertations.
2301.
https://scholar.afit.edu/etd/2301
a 
HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS: SHIPPING DESIGNS FOR THE POST 
DISASTER CARGO SURGE 
THESIS 
Nicholas L. Green, Captain, USAF 
AFIT-ENS-MS-19-M-118 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR UNIVERSITY 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; 
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the 
United States Government. 
AFIT-ENS-MS-19-M-118 
HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS: SHIPPING DESIGNS FOR THE POST DISASTER 
CARGO SURGE 
THESIS 
Presented to the Faculty 
Department of Operational Sciences 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management 
Air Force Institute of Technology 
Air University 
Air Education and Training Command 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Master of Science in Logistics and Supply Chain Management 
Nicholas L. Green, BA 
Captain, USAF 
March 2019 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; 
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 AFIT-ENS-MS-19-M-118 
 
 
HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS: SHIPPING DESIGNS FOR THE POST DISASTER 
CARGO SURGE 
 
 
 
 
Nicholas L. Green 
Captain, USAF 
 
 
 
Committee Membership: 
 
 
 
Maj Timothy Breitbach, PhD 
Chair 
 
 
 
Daniel Steeneck, PhD 
Member 
 
 
 
iv 
AFIT-ENS-MS-19-M-118 
Abstract 
 
 In 2017 Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico. The humanitarian aid 
community scrambled a response to support the 3.4 million people affected by the 
disaster. In response, thousands of shipping containers filled with supplies were sent to 
the island. Numerous reports surfaced regarding significant delays in receiving the 
shipments. This research reviews the historical account of cargo throughput into Puerto 
Rico following Maria. A computer simulation built in ARENA compares various what-if 
scenarios based on empirically collected data and interviews with FEMA, port 
authorities, and commercial cargo carriers to determine how the humanitarian supply 
chain could improve for future disaster planning. An additional goal of this research is to 
better inform humanitarian logisticians who must balance near-term disaster response 
demands with long term recovery concerns.  
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HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS: SHIPPING DESIGNS FOR THE POST 
DISASTER CARGO SURGE 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The Location 
Puerto Rico is a U.S. territorial island in the western North Atlantic Ocean. There 
are approximately 3.4 million people on the island (US Census Bureau, 2018). The 
median household income in Puerto Rico is $19,343, much lower than the U.S. median of 
$60,336 (US Census Bureau, 2018). The territory’s primary exports are pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, and medical equipment (US Census Bureau, 2019). By early 2017 the public 
utilities were considered degraded from limited funding and a dilapidated infrastructure 
(Dooley, 2017). The island relies completely on maritime imports to sustain energy and 
to stock general commodities. These imports are processed through one major seaport on 
the north side of the island in the city of San Juan. There is a second major port on the 
south side of the island in the city of Ponce that is inactive, and a terminal on the east side 
of the island in Yabucoa for energy imports. The port of San Juan acts as the primary 
lifeline for all of the island’s basic commodity needs. 
The 2017 Hurricane Season 
Historically, Puerto Rico has been affected by hurricanes about every 3.4 years, 
and directly hit by a major hurricane every 20 years (Williams, 2018). On September 
20th of 2017, Puerto Rico was hit head on by Hurricane Maria, a category 4 hurricane, 
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which crawled across the island over a two-day period. The island’s entire population of 
3.4 million people were affected by the storm (World Vision Staff, 2018). Some people 
were affected by the loss of public utilities, some displaced from their homes indefinitely, 
and over a thousand people were killed (Kessler, 2018). 
Hurricane Maria was one of three major hurricanes to affect the U.S. during the 
2017 hurricane season (Vaccaro, 2017). Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria all struck 
U.S. populations within a few months of each other. Harvey struck Texas on August 25th. 
Irma struck the Virgin Islands on September 6th and Florida on September 10th. Maria 
struck Puerto Rico on the September 20th. Additionally, four other large storms hit the 
U.S. during this same busy season (Vaccaro, 2017). In their 2017 Hurricane Season After 
Action Report, the Federal Emergency Management Agency stated,  
“The fact that these historic storms occurred concurrently and were followed by 
the California Wildfires presented an unprecedented scale of operations, 
extremely complex logistics, and numerous novel challenges across the Nation” 
(FEMA, 2018:1). 
As Hurricane Irma passed Puerto Rico in the beginning of September, much of 
the local humanitarian aid safety stock on island was dispatched to support the survival 
and recovery efforts going on in the nearby Virgin Islands and elsewhere in the 
continental United States. By the time Hurricane Maria hit on September 20th, an 
estimated 80,000 people were still without electricity and trying to recover from 
Hurricane Irma. Roughly fourteen days after Hurricane Irma, Maria struck Puerto Rico 
head on.  
Considered the worst natural disaster to affect Puerto Rico in the last 80 years, 
Hurricane Maria crawled across the island, ripping it apart with winds up to 155mph 
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(World Vision Staff, 2018). The hurricane made landfall in the south east corner of the 
island and moved across the center of the island toward the northwest corner (Pasch, 
Penny, & Berg, 2017). Several shipping vessels inbound to Puerto Rico were forced to 
redirect out of the hurricane’s path (Green, 2018). Mudslides, trees, powerlines and 
debris covered the roadways which temporarily shut down the island’s distribution 
network. Many of the businesses who rely on large shipments of commodities from the 
port of San Juan were temporarily unable to receive shipments, due to the businesses’ 
lack of power to refrigerate items or degraded facilities that were not fit for warehousing 
(Green, 2018). 
The island’s transportation network was temporarily crippled. After Hurricane 
Maria an island wide fuel shortage ensued and cars were lined up at gas stations waiting 
for their turn to get fuel for hours on end (Lubben, 2017). This in turn meant trucking 
fleets could not operate at full capacity and drivers couldn’t report to work during a 
critical time for supply distribution. Shipping companies brought mobile laundromats, 
meals, kitchens, water, blankets, and other care packages and supplies for their 
employees and families in order to keep the sea ports running full time (Green, 2018). 
Given the setbacks affecting the transportation system in and around Puerto Rico 
directly after Hurricane Maria, media reports began to surface claiming that the delivery 
of humanitarian aid was shamefully slow (HCMG Editorial, 2017). Patients were in need 
of medical supplies and a number of Puerto Rican residents were running out of food and 
water which added stress to the situation (Simon et al., 2017). Many of these people 
wondered where the humanitarian aid supplies had gone. Meanwhile, at the port of San 
Juan, a representative from one of the local shipping companies pointed out a bottleneck 
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in the system by highlighting that there were an estimated ten thousand containers of 
supplies sitting at the port filled with food, water, and medicine (Gillespie et al., 2017). 
Thousands of containers were indeed sitting in the port of San Juan awaiting delivery 
(Green, 2018). Normal freight had been accumulating while awaiting the hurricane’s 
passage. Additionally, a surge of freight to replenish what was forecasted in sales from 
the disaster was inbound. Furthermore, humanitarian aid organizations began pushing 
relief supplies to the island. The simultaneous increases of inbound freight and inbound 
humanitarian aid to Puerto Rico was beginning to show, but many wondered why the 
freight was not leaving the port as fast as it was arriving. 
The major sea freight shipping companies operating out of the port of San Juan 
unanimously agreed that freight was not being picked up by the consignees, or end user 
customers, nearly as fast as they were prior to the hurricane (Green, 2018). This 
transportation delay will be referred to later in the research as customer availability. The 
problem many of the businesses faced after the hurricane was reopening without power, 
with damaged facilities, and/or with a limited staff. No power meant an inability to keep 
refrigerated goods cold, and damaged facilities meant decreased room and security for 
warehousing inventory. Thus, the port of San Juan inadvertently turned into a satellite 
storage facility for many businesses who were not ready to receive their inbound 
shipments (Green, 2018). Businesses who could receive shipments faced the dilemma of 
not having enough trucks and drivers available to pick up their goods from the port. 
Many of the drivers were still putting their homes back together and getting their families 
situated. Additionally, widespread fuel shortages limited the amount of deliveries that 
could be completed. 
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The Disaster Response 
FEMA is America’s leading governmental organization for disaster relief. FEMA 
anticipated the combined danger of Hurricane Maria’s timing behind Hurricane Irma and 
the quickly depleting safety stock of humanitarian supplies they had remaining on the 
island of Puerto Rico. Thus, FEMA began shipping humanitarian relief supplies prior to 
Maria’s impact (Green, 2018). However, with the magnitude of damage and 
overwhelming number of people affected, the humanitarian aid community had to 
quickly respond to a much larger than anticipated demand for relief.  
Shipping humanitarian supplies to Puerto Rico was no easy feat for the 
continental United States based humanitarian organizations to complete. Recent 
shipments within the continental U.S. to disaster victims of hurricane Harvey in Texas, or 
Hurricane Nate in Mississippi had been a much simpler task. For example, if FEMA were 
to ship a truckload of food and water to Mississippi, it would have a truck pick up the 
supplies from one of their warehouses, and then send the truck to the federal or regional 
state-owned staging area. To ship the same truck load of supplies to Puerto Rico, the 
supplies are trucked from a federal warehouse and then to the port of Jacksonville 
Florida. The supplies are containerized when a container is made available. The container 
is then loaded onto a vessel when a vessel becomes available, followed by a five to six-
day transit time. Once the vessel arrives at the port of San Juan in Puerto Rico, the vessel 
is then offloaded, where the container waits in the yard for another truck to deliver it. 
Once a truck and driver are available, the container is loaded onto the truck and then 
dispatched to a federal staging area. At the federal staging area, the container can be 
unloaded and the supplies can be broken down into smaller straight trucks. The straight 
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trucks are then sent to regional staging areas owned by the state, at which point the state 
decides which delivery site needs supplies the most and distributes accordingly. The key 
point is that the total number of touch points required to get humanitarian supplies to the 
intended destination increases when shipping to an island versus within the mainland. 
Thus, added opportunities for delivery delays occur. 
The Research Question 
The reacting surge of humanitarian aid supplies took longer than desired to reach 
the intended recipients. The disaster response phase continued for several months as 
back-to-back shipments of food, water, blue tarp roofing, fuel, service vehicles, and other 
supplies were being coordinated out of the port of Jacksonville, Florida (Green, 2018). As 
the disaster response phase slowly evolved into the recovery phase, statements were 
surfacing across the media that implied the humanitarian aid community was handling the 
aftermath of Hurricane Maria poorly. Example headlines included: “Puerto Rico aid is 
trapped in thousands of shipping containers” (Gillespie et al., 2017), “…Logistical 
Failings Have Stalled Hurricane Maria Recovery Efforts” (SupplyChainX, 2018), and 
“Logistics Challenges Hinder Hurricane Maria Recovery” (APICS, 2017). Over a year 
later humanitarian aid organizations have continued to assist the island in recovery 
efforts. The extensive lead times involved in the delivery of humanitarian aid has led to 
the following research question: How did the supply chain design and carrier choice 
affect the delivery of humanitarian response and recovery cargo after Hurricane Maria? 
Answering this research question will help prepare Puerto Rico for future disaster 
response and recovery. Also, the research question applies to other island territories who 
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face similar logistical struggles during the disaster response and recovery phases. 
Furthermore, answering the research question will assist FEMA in achieving their goals 
for logistics improvement as explained in the FEMA 2017 hurricane season after action 
report. The objectives of the report were to increase transportation planning, 
management, and contract support capacities, quickly deliver key commodities, 
streamline movement across multiple modes of transportation that facilitate and speed 
recovery, and develop a more comprehensive understanding of supply chains to support 
rapid restoration to catastrophic incidents (FEMA, 2018).  
A simulation analysis was chosen to answer the research question. In order to 
build the simulation, the supply chain in and around the Port of San Juan in Puerto is 
examined. The research focuses on maritime shipments, which comprised the bulk of the 
disaster response cargo. The goal of the research is to derive conclusions as to how the 
humanitarian supply chain timeline could have been improved.  
The paper will continue with a literature review of relevant topics surrounding the 
research question, methodology, and how the methodology was employed for this 
research. The research results and analysis will then be discussed. Lastly, the paper ends 
with conclusions and recommendations based on empirical data gathered in Puerto Rico, 
available literature, and the simulation’s quantitative output.  
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II. Literature Review 
The literature review will first explain the disaster management continuum of 
recovery. Supply chain improvement and success measures will then be discussed, 
followed by considerations within the context of humanitarian logistics. Next, FEMA’s 
disaster management tactics and capabilities are reviewed with respect to Hurricane 
Maria. Lastly, literature about the simulation methodology is discussed. 
The Continuum of Recovery 
Two of the core phases in any disaster management model include disaster 
response and disaster recovery. This research focuses on those two phases in particular 
and their logistical impact surrounding the event of Hurricane Maria. Carter (2008) 
explains that a response phase consists of measures taken immediately prior to and 
following disaster impact that are directed toward saving life and protecting property. 
Carter (2008) goes on to explain that unlike the response phase, the recovery phase is a 
longer process marked by restoration, rehabilitation, and reconstruction efforts. It is 
important to note that in this research the response and recovery phases are both involved 
in the data used, since the two phases often overlap one another. As the response or 
rescue phase draws down, the longer-term community recovery efforts ramp up. The 
overlap of the response and recovery phases is illustrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  Continuum of Recovery (MacDonald et al., 2015) 
Supply Chain Improvement 
The supply chain “is an essential part of humanitarian aid operations” (Agostinho, 
2013:210). Supply chains are composed of several chain links of suppliers and providers. 
To answer the research question of how a supply chain could be improved, one must first 
ask what makes a humanitarian supply chain successful? Yadav & Barve (2015) claim 
that the 'agile humanitarian supply chain' is an indication of the most successful supply 
chains, which builds on the shoulders of continuous process improvement systems. Agile 
can be defined as “the ability of a supply chain to rapidly respond to changes in market 
and customer demands” (Jain, Benyoucef, & Deshmukh, 2008:367). This is in part 
achieved by way of data analysis and forecasting of demand. However, customer 
demands during the response phase can be very difficult to estimate. Beamon (1999) 
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proposes three measures to assess a supply chain’s performance that will be adapted for 
this study: resource measures (R), output measures (O), and flexibility measures (F). 
Resource measures will be assessed in this study as queue lengths and times, output 
measures will be assessed as the total volume of freight moving through the supply chain, 
and flexibility measures will be assessed as the supply chain’s reaction to change. 
One option for improving delivery times during the response phase is to have 
safety stock in prepositioned warehouses. Prepositioning inventory “can enhance the 
responsiveness of relief chains, but decrease the cost-eﬃciency because of high inventory 
costs” (Ali Torabi, Shokr, Tofighi, & Heydari, 2018:143). At the time of Hurricane Maria 
FEMA owned a warehouse for pre-positioned inventory in Puerto Rico. However, the 
inventory was depleted two weeks prior to Maria to support the victims in the Virgin 
Islands impacted by Hurricane Irma. With respect to the research question for this study, 
pre-positioned inventory would expedite the delivery of supplies during the response 
phase. As of early 2019 FEMA is reportedly looking to open more warehouses with pre-
positioned inventory in the Puerto Rican area to better prepare the Caribbean region for 
future disaster-prone seasons. Therefore, this research will focus more on the 
transportation between supply nodes during the response and recovery phases, and how 
that can be improved based on the case of Hurricane Maria as an isolated event. 
Hurricane Maria’s Logistics 
A 2017 report out of MIT highlighted some of the various components involved 
in Hurricane Maria’s post disaster logistics timeline in the following statement: “Drivers, 
trucks, containers, roads, telecommunications, fuel, power, and more were all equally-
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important elements in the system. Shortages or reduced capacity in any of these 
subsystems created shortages or reduced capacity for the entire system” (Goentzel et al., 
2017:11). The idea of reducing throughput capacity in one subsystem affecting capacity 
for the entire system is derived from the Theory of Constraints (TOC). TOC involves 
defining a system’s goal, performance measures, and constraints, and then seeks to 
optimize the system by leveraging those features (Goldratt & Cox, 2014). The TOC is a 
lens through which this research’s method will be built. The identification of constraints, 
or bottlenecks, will be key to the recreation of the historical account of aid shipments to 
Puerto Rico. Transportation bottlenecks such as port processing capacity, weather delays 
for vessels, vessel capacity, road delivery delays, and customer availability are all 
considered in the method design.  
FEMA’s primary logistical mission is to, “deliver the right resources to the right 
place at the right time in support of state, local, tribal governments and territories” 
(FEMA, 2015:1).  “Saving lives takes priority and, given the unknown scale of any event 
in the early hours, it makes sense to estimate worst-case demand for relief supplies” 
(Goentzel et al., 2017:10). FEMA accomplishes a big, fast, and smart response by way of 
pre-negotiated contracts with logistics and commodity providers in order to meet the 
relative surge demands of a given disaster. Additionally, FEMA maintains caches of 
safety stock that are ready to distribute but does not maintain their own trucking or 
maritime logistics fleets. During the surge of disaster response, a large amount of 
transportation capacity is needed, which is the area of focus for this research. FEMA did 
not have a surge fleet available to call on during Hurricane Maria. Thus, FEMA was 
wholly reliant on the available maritime shipping carriers that service Puerto Rico. 
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Transportation is left to the private sector experts who execute transportation functions 
daily with their pre-established routes and infrastructure. Humanitarian organizations are 
recommended to take a supervisory role instead of running the transportation network 
(Wang, Wu, Liang, & Huang, 2016). This research reviews the major transportation 
providers available during the event of Hurricane Maria with respect to the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Puerto Rico. 
Computer Simulation Analysis 
This research was conducted using a quantitative approach through a computer 
simulation. Empirical data was collected to inform the simulation model and to interpret 
the simulation results. The simulation serves as the major component of data analysis. 
Simulations are ideal for exploring the relationships between variables (Chandrasekaran, 
Linderman, & Sting, 2018). The simulation method in research provides a cost-effective 
means of testing hypothetical scenarios, especially in this case with a large supply chain 
containing multiple transportation providers over land and ocean. Simulation is used to 
“investigate a wide variety of what if questions about the real-world system” (Banks, et 
al., 2010:3). Simulations are subject to their scope and limitations, but “are a good 
starting point in any planning process” (Banomyong & Sopadang, 2010:720). The results 
of this simulation could be considered in the humanitarian aid community’s planning 
process in preparation for future disaster seasons. Simulations are also “one of the most 
widely used operations-research and management-science techniques, if not the most 
widely used” (Law & Kelton, 1991:2). When exact information can be acquired, an 
analytical study can be used with mathematical methods (Law & Kelton, 1991). 
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However, the real-world system being modeled in this research is complex, and the data 
acquired are estimates from experts. Thus, instead of mathematical methods, a simulation 
becomes an ideal methodology to employ in this case.  
Literature Summary 
Response and recovery are two distinct phases of disaster management that 
overlap. Supply chains are essential to humanitarian operations. Increasing safety stock, 
pre-positioned inventory, and awareness of the supply chain as a whole are typical 
actions to improve responsiveness. FEMA’s tactic during disaster response is to surge. 
Transportation requirements are normally fulfilled by to the private sector. Finally, the 
research approach is a simulation used to explore alternative scenarios. 
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III.  Methodology 
The methodology begins by outlining the data collection process. Interviews laid 
the foundation for the simulation process map and data points. The historical context 
through the eyes of the interviewees is captured to best interpret the results of the 
simulation. The simulation’s mechanics are then explained. The simulation’s 
assumptions, limitations, and intended features in recreating the historical account are 
highlighted throughout the chapter. Lastly, scenarios designed for testing within the 
model are delineated. 
Data Collection 
The data collection process was initialized through a contact with FEMA 
headquarters in Washington, DC. The simulation method was chosen to examine the 
entirety of the historical account in motion and to compare values. A draft simulation 
model was created based on available information on the web about the port of San Juan 
in Puerto Rico, the port of Jacksonville in Florida, and from sea port research by Franzén 
& Streling (2017). The simulation was developed using Arena simulation software 
(Rockwell Automation, 2019). Contact was then made with the FEMA personnel in 
Puerto Rico to discuss the best way to collect empirical data to refine and inform the 
model. A list of stakeholders was generated surrounding the humanitarian logistics of 
Hurricane Maria and forwarded to the FEMA Puerto Rico logistics team as shown in 
Table 1. Attempts were made by both FEMA and the researcher to make contact with all 
parties listed.  
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Table 1.  Interview Contact List
 
Meetings were held in the FEMA operations center in Puerto Rico in December 
of 2018. Empirical data was collected using written notes and guided discussions from 
the simulation model. Suggested edits and data estimates for the simulation model were 
acquired. Specific details of the methodology and data collection process can be found in 
the appendices. 
Data Findings 
The entities in this simulation are shipping container Twenty-foot Equivalent 
Units (TEUs). Note that many of the containers shipped to Puerto Rico are actually 53’ 
foot container trailers, on a Roll On Roll Off (RORO) style barge (Green, 2018). 
However, the industry representatives interviewed provided container totals that are 
calculated into TEU equivalents for data consistency. 
The three major domestic carriers who service Puerto Rico are TOTE Maritime, 
Crowley Logistics, and Trailer Bridge. There are other international carriers who service 
Process Role Contacts Interviewed
Alternate port Port of the Americas Authority - Ponce X
Carrier Crowley X
Carrier NYK
Carrier Tote X
Carrier Trailer Bridge X
Disaster management FEMA Puerto Rico logistics team X
Disaster management State Disaster Management Agency
Land distribution Transportation and Freeway Authority
Land distribution National Guard X
Port Maritime Transport Authority
Port Port Authority - San Juan X
Port of origin JAX
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Puerto Rico as well, but they are excluded from the research due to the Jones Act. The 
Jones Act requires that vessels traveling between two US ports be U.S. flagged, owned, 
and crewed (66th U.S. Congress, 1920).  In the interviews it was reported that the three 
major maritime domestic carriers servicing Puerto Rico out of the port of Jacksonville, 
had a divided share of the total throughput of freight as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Crowley and TOTE each move an estimated 1800 TEUs per week, and Trailer 
Bridge moves an estimated 900 TEUs per week. The estimated containers moved per 
week are used as a baseline for a set of entities called normal freight within the 
simulation. Normal freight entities, or TEUs are created during the entire simulation and 
considered the pre-hurricane every day demand flow. When combined, the weekly TEUs 
moved by all three carrier equalled 4500 TEUs. The division of those 4500 TEUs is 
considered the unit market share breakdown, shown in Figure 2 as the 40%, 40%, and 
Figure 2.   Major Domestic Carriers Servicing Puerto Rico 
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20% divided share. This division will be referred to later in the research as the 40/40/20 
split. 
Immediately after Hurricane Maria, all carriers experienced a 45% increase in 
TEU throughput, independent of humanitarian aid (HA) TEUs. That normal demand 
increase then declined and stabilized at a net 20% increase for the next year. The average 
amount of TEUs carried per vessel, the fleet sizes before and after Hurricane Maria, and 
the travel time for vessels are all featured in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Carrier Shipping Data 
 
FEMA’s HA cargo was shipped via a pre-negotiated contract with Crowley. Pre-
negotiated contracts are common for FEMA, since it is a means to improve 
responsiveness and sort out many of the contracting details prior to a moment of crisis 
(Thornton, 2017). HA cargo started flowing to Puerto Rico seven days prior to the 
hurricane in response to Hurricane Irma and totaled 8000 TEUs. 
Modeling 
An extensive review of the simulation model was completed upon returning from 
Puerto Rico. The model was refined to recreate the historical account of Hurricane Maria 
by modeling the actual supply chain available and incorporating the feedback of 
interviewees regarding the process model. After adding the actual data points obtained 
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from the interviews, the model was tuned to produce salient features of the historical 
event as described by the interviewees.  
The simulation model revolves around the concept of entities that enter the system 
model at a specified arrival rate, and then pass through processes where they seize 
resources required for process completion while being subject to processing times and 
queues. Entities encounter conditional rerouting events based on system attributes during 
the simulation runtime. The system’s flow finishes at a disposal on the far-right side of 
the model where an entity’s journey is completed. The simulation run parameters can be 
set for a specified length and can be run multiple times to compare values and obtain 
averages.  
 
Figure 3.  Simulation Model Overview 
The overarching process flow for the research simulation designed is depicted in 
Figure 3. The three major carriers each have their own normal demand for cargo modeled 
within the simulation that is independent of HA cargo. After TEUs from the normal 
demand enter the system, they queue at the port of Jacksonville in the respective carrier’s 
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yard. The TEUs are then processed into batches and queue to be loaded onto vessels. 
Once aboard a vessel, TEUs wait the specified transit time from Jacksonville to the port 
of San Juan in Puerto Rico. Once arriving in Puerto Rico, the TEUs queue to be offloaded 
from the vessel. When TEUs are processed off of the vessels they then queue to be 
loaded onto trucks. After a TEU is loaded onto a truck, the truck completes its delivery 
and the TEU exits the model. HA TEUs follow the same process flow as normal TEUs in 
the model. However, which carrier HA TEUs are allocated to is adjustable. 
Fleet sizes increased one week after the hurricane in response to increased 
demand. A frequent comment from the carriers, was that they can always find more ships 
to move containers. They have no concern for total capacity and they will find a way to 
move the containers assigned to them. Shipping delays were also built into the simulation 
to model the effects of the hurricane on waterways, roadway obstructions, and customer 
availability for receiving cargo immediately after the hurricane. 
Model Validation 
A series of variables was programmed for recording into a spreadsheet to ensure 
the model recreated the historical account of Hurricane Maria as it was described during 
the interviews. The variables are recorded daily and measure how many TEUs are in the 
system, how many TEUs are in each queue, and whether or not a system delay has been 
activated. The model was tested for one simulated year with 100 replications. The 
variables were used to verify no infinite queues existed and that salient milestones within 
the logistical account of Hurricane Maria were being met. 
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 Following model validation that the baseline simulation was reflecting what was 
understood to be reality, a follow up phone conference was scheduled with the FEMA 
personnel to validate the model with expert opinion. It was determined in the phone 
conference that the port of Ponce needed good representation in the model as a possible 
option for future HA delivery to Puerto Rico. Otherwise, the conversation concluded that 
the model was meeting all other salient features of the historical event and that after 
Ponce was added as a shipping option for HA in the model, it would be time to press 
forward with running tests. 
Ponce 
The addition of Ponce, also known as the Rafael Cordero Santiago Puerto de las 
Americas (Google Maps, 2019), was constructed in the model similar to the three major 
carriers represented. The general idea of Ponce as a shipping option is completely 
hypothetical at this point. There is no specific data that clarifies Ponce’s throughput 
capacity to the researcher’s knowledge. This is due to the fact that Ponce currently has no 
demand. It is a large and beautiful port that was built as an economic expansion for 
Puerto Rico that has yet to attract sustained business investments in the local area. There 
are two gantry cranes in Ponce that were pending maintenance as of the time of the 
interviews held, a mobile crane, space for 3 vessels, room for 8000 containers when 
stacked four high, and hook ups for refrigerated containers. The port was open for 
business the day after the hurricane passed and cleared by the coast guard for business. 
Lift On Lift Off (LOLO) barges like those owned by Trailer Bridge are able to arrive at 
ports like Ponce and use their own cranes to unload their own vessels. Crowley was asked 
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to make some of their deliveries out of Ponce, but after a cost analysis they quickly found 
it much cheaper to use their own terminal, employees, and equipment out of San Juan and 
then truck the containers across the island where needed. All carriers interviewed 
preferred their own terminals over having to operate out of Ponce. It made no sense for 
the carriers to relocate their sea port operations across the island in terms of cost and 
efficiency. Military Sealift Command was reported to have berthed several times at 
Ponce after Hurricane Maria to deliver shipments. The thought of the government using 
the port of Ponce as an independent location from San Juan during the interviews was 
deliberated. The discussion led to the speculative conclusion that if the surge of HA 
TEUs were shipped through Ponce they would not delay shipments intended for 
economic recovery in San Juan. The use of Ponce as an alternative port would deconflict 
the two surges of normal TEUs and HA TEUs. 
Scenarios Designed for Simulation 
Once the model was completed and the baseline simulation results validated with 
FEMA, several scenarios were designed. The scenarios are shown in Table 3. Scenario 
run refers to the label of each unique scenario designed for simulation. The incremental 
changes in the model are highlighted in the next six columns to the right of the scenario 
labels. 
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Table 3.  Scenarios Designed for Simulation 
 
The first simulation created that is labeled model validation was run for 52 weeks 
to ensure no infinite queues or unrealistic conditions exited. The simulation is then 
scoped to a twelve week window for a closer comparative analysis among scenario 
results. Scenario zero was run several months prior to the hurricane to obtain the twelve 
week baseline data with no hurricane. Scenario one slides the twelve weeks to start a 
week and a half prior to the hurricane to capture the hurricane and its effects in the 
historical context. Scenario two looks at what would happen if Bayamon was never made 
available for Crowley. Scenario three splits the HA shipments evenly among the three 
major domestic carriers: TOTE, Crowley, and Trailer Bridge instead of 100% to 
Crowley. Scenario four splits the HA shipments identical to the island’s normal freight 
unit market share breakdown allocating 40% to TOTE, 40% to Crowley, and 20% to 
Trailer Bridge. Scenario five explores what would happen if road delays for trucks 
exiting the ports were doubled. Scenario six reduces the percentage of customers able to 
receive cargo for the first two weeks following the hurricane to 10%, in other words only 
Scenario Run
Sim 
duration 
(weeks)
Hurricane 
activated
Bayamon 
opened HA routing
Road 
delays
Customer 
availability
Model validation 52 x x Cr 100% 48hrs 40%
0 - base 1 may 12 no N/A N/A 48hrs 40%
1 - base 11 sep 12 x x Cr 100% 48hrs 40%
2 - no bayamon 12 x no Cr 100% 48hrs 40%
3 - HA one third 12 x no 33/33/33% 48hrs 40%
4 - HA 40/40/20 12 x no 40/40/20% 48hrs 40%
5 - road delay doubled 12 x x Cr 100% 96hrs 40%
6 - customer availability 10% 12 x x Cr 100% 48hrs 10%
7 - customer availability 90% 12 x x Cr 100% 48hrs 90%
8 - HA through Ponce 12 x N/A Po 100% 48hrs 40%
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10% of cargo leaves the port each day. Scenario seven improves the customer availability 
for receiving cargo to 90%. Scenario eight routes all HA shipments through Ponce via an 
external fourth carrier to explore the effect of fully deconflicting HA and normal demand 
shipments on island. Resulting simulation output for each scenario is discussed in chapter 
four. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
 The data analysis is conducted with several aims in mind. First, the analysis aims 
to find differences across the simulation’s queues, total inventory levels, and reaction to 
change. Second, having identified the differences among simulations, the analysis seeks 
to ultimately answer the research question. Since the data used to inform the simulation is 
based on general estimates from industry experts, a specific target number of replications 
was incalculable since no variance could be derived. The first simulation was replicated 
100 times. Then, the same simulation was run 25 times and results were nearly identical. 
All other simulations were likewise run with 25 replications. The simulation output 
yielded a large amount of data, thus aggregate charts are shown for comparative analysis 
among simulations. The base data and all other ARENA output are included in the 
appendices.  
Queues 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 indicate the wait times and lengths of queues in each 
scenario. Both figures sum the results of all TEU types within the model. TEU types 
include normal demand TEUs from Crowley, normal demand TEUs from TOTE, normal 
demand TEUs from Trailer Bridge, and HA TEUs. Figure 4 compares how many hours a 
TEU will wait on average in queues during the scenario. Figure 5 compares how many 
TEUs on average are waiting in a queue during the scenario. Ponce is included as a fourth 
shipping carrier in all scenarios. Weighted averages take into consideration when Ponce 
has zero TEUs assigned, so as not to inflate results with added system capacity when 
Ponce is used. From these two figures we see that TEUs wait in faster and smaller queues 
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in scenarios three, four, and eight. The summed average queue times are weighted using 
the following formula:  
∑ 𝑡𝑖 (
𝑛𝑖
𝑁
) =  𝑡1 (
𝑛1
𝑁
) + 𝑡2 (
𝑛2
𝑁
) … 𝑡𝑗 (
𝑛𝑗
𝑁
)
𝑗
𝑖=1
                                 (1) 
Where t is the average queue times, n is the number in queue, and N is the total number in 
all queues. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Average Time TEUs Collectively Wait in Queues 
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Figure 5.  Number of TEUs Collectively Waiting in Queues 
Total System Times 
Total system times refers to the total amount of time it takes for a TEU to 
complete shipment. When averages for all TEU total times are weighted for all TEU 
types combined, there are still distinguishing characteristics among scenarios. Figure 6 
shows the average total time that each TEU type takes to process through the entire 
model. Figure 6 then finds the weighted average for those total times based on how many 
TEUs each TEU type represents. TEU types can take more or less time than others types 
to transit the system depending on how busy each carrier or delivery route is within the 
model. Thus, the totals in Figure 6 highlight how TEUs spend a combined 19-20 hours 
less during scenarios four and eight to complete their journey on average. Interestingly, 
scenario seven is comparable to scenario three, indicating that customer availability has a 
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similar impact to carrier design on overall TEU delivery times. This is also apparent in 
Scenario six where limited customer availability raises the combined times for TEUs up 
by an outstanding 61 hours from the base scenario. 
 
Figure 6.  Average Time Required for TEUs to Complete Shipment 
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Surge Duration 
 A look at the curve of the TEU surge over time shows how long the system takes 
to return to a normal steady state. The total amount of all TEUs within a scenario are 
recorded daily and charted in Figure 7. Scenario one processes the surge and returns to a 
normal throughput baseline and system inventory level of about 5000-6000 TEUs per day 
75 days after the simulation begins. Scenarios two and five are not shown as they do not 
add value to this analysis. Scenarios three and four return to the throughput baseline 50 
days after the simulation begins, 25 days faster than scenario one or almost a month 
sooner. Scenario three is slightly higher than four. In scenario three the smaller of the 
three carriers for this simulation, Trailer Bridge, is slightly overwhelmed by the 33% 
allocation of HA TEUs. In scenario four when Trailer Bridge is allocated 20% of the 
TEUs commensurate with the normal demand unit market share breakdown, Trailer 
Bridge is able to keep pace with the other carriers. If Trailer Bridge were configured with 
more vessels in the simulation similar to Crowley, they would match throughput and 
inventory levels. Scenario six shows a much higher spike in the total system inventory 
level, due to poor customer availability, and resolves the surge 82 days after the 
simulation starts. 
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Figure 7.  Daily System Inventory 
 Scenario eight lingers around 8000 for about 20 days and then starts declining 
toward a system steady state. However, a closer look at scenario eight shows that the 
surge could be resolved and the inventory returned to a normal steady state after 40 days 
if it were not for the inventory levels at Ponce. Figure 8 shows scenario eight by itself, 
with all TEU types represented within that scenario by carrier. Inventory levels at Ponce 
drive the second curve in scenario eight’s total system inventory levels. The TEU 
processing times at Ponce were configured similar to Trailer Bridge, since Trailer Bridge 
is the smallest of the three carriers featured in this research and best representative of a 
carrier company that would operate out of Ponce. However, the real-world processing 
times in Ponce are completely relative because there are no data estimates to work with. 
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Ponce is a big beautiful port with close to no business at this time. As discussed 
previously, it was designed as an economic expansion to the island but has yet to take off. 
Thus, any deductions from scenario eight are truly relative to a carrier’s ability to run 
operations out of Ponce. Pros and cons of operating HA reception out of Ponce will be 
discussed further in chapter five.  
 
Figure 8.  System Inventory by Carrier during Scenario 8 
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V.  Conclusions 
Chapter V further addresses how carrier design, alternative port, and customer 
availability findings impacted the Hurricane Maria response. Conclusive 
recommendations based on the simulation results and empirical data are then applied to 
the governmental and the global humanitarian audiences. Future research and limitations 
from the study are then discussed. 
Finding 1 – The 40/40/20 split 
 Scenario four was configured to distribute HA TEUs amongst the three major 
domestic carriers in a way that reflects the unit market share between them. The 
proportionate distribution allowed all three carriers to return to a normal baseline of 
inventory throughput levels sooner than other scenarios. The distribution did not overload 
any particular carrier and minimized queue times and sizes. The proportionate 
distribution idea is also valid for future carrier selection. The future distribution 
percentages of HA TEUs would generally mirror the evolved unit market share for the 
region as it changes over time. Using the 40/40/20 split method also leverages the 
benefits of using pre-existing carriers who are experts at serving the customer base in that 
region. Discretion in the distribution would be required in the event that one or more of 
the carriers experience a reduced capacity or reduced operational effectiveness due to the 
effects of a disaster. However, carriers already have the vessels, cranes, manning, 
training, and trucking networks established and operating. Using a carrier also means 
leveraging that carrier’s resources and connections on site to get the job done, with no 
additional startup times and costs. 
32 
Finding 2 – Hypothetical Impact of Ponce 
 
Figure 9.  Picture of the Port in Ponce 
The idea of using Ponce completely deconflicts the two surges of normal TEUs 
and HA TEUs. Results in the scenarios for Ponce were quantitatively compelling, 
however data estimates used to drive Ponce were derived from the other carriers. There 
are no expert industry estimates for Ponce since there is close to no activity there. It has 
an 8000 TEU capacity and is normally empty. The question in using Ponce becomes one 
of how fast the port can be brought online and at what cost? Longshoreman and 
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serviceable equipment have to be acquired to unload vessels. The two red gantry cranes 
shown in Figure 9 were offline, pending maintenance. This had been the case for some 
time when the data was collected. A carrier willing to berth at Ponce must be found. A 
trucking fleet willing to operate out of Ponce that can handle the mountain ranges that 
stretch across the center of the island must be organized. Simulation eight was designed 
under the assumption that operations out of Ponce could begin immediately after the 
hurricane similar to the other carriers in the port of San Juan. If there is a start-up time 
associated with opening Ponce post-disaster, then that start up time introduces a potential 
opportunity cost of lost time that could have been used to ship HA TEUs via the pre-
existing domestic carriers. Furthermore, any start up times would increase the total times 
reported for scenario eight in the analysis. Regardless, Ponce is the primary alternative to 
San Juan. If a boat sunk in the entryway to San Juan or if a disaster caused sufficient 
damage to San Juan, nothing would get in or out. The lifeline to Puerto Rico would be 
cut. Thus, Ponce is a prime target for further research. 
Finding 3 – Customer Availability 
 When comparing total system inventory levels over time, customer availability 
was shown to have a large impact. Carriers can process containers into the port at any 
rate, but are unable to process containers out if customers are unable to receive them. 
Thus, returning key business online immediately after a disaster has a high impact on 
freight delays. This applies to all TEUs as they will be caught in longer queues and fuller 
ports. Ports that are backed up with containers need more time to sort and load them onto 
trucks. A busy yard was one of the primary reasons why Crowley opened Bayamon. The 
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Crowley yard morphed into a satellite storage for customers unable to accept cargo and 
the HA TEUs had to be placed somewhere accessible for further processing to FEMA’s 
staging areas. When ports are online, but businesses have been heavily affected by a 
disaster like Hurricane Maria, then restoring customer availability becomes a priority for 
unblocking the flow of containers. 
Recommendations for the U.S. State and Federal Levels  
Divide a surge of humanitarian aid among the available carriers appropriately. Doing so 
requires awareness of the unit market share breakdown and awareness of the potential 
effect of the disaster on the carriers that may reduce their effectiveness. Appropriate 
contracting processes and supportive culture are also required that will enable logistics 
planners the freedom to leverage all available transportation capacity in the system. Pre-
negotiation in contracting needs to maintain a sufficient level of flexibility to optimize 
throughput.  
Explore secondary ports and shipping locations. Logistics planners need increased 
awareness of infrastructure readiness, the cost of operations, and the comparative speed 
of operations for an alternative port versus using pre-existing carriers who already service 
the region. Acquiring this data will better enable logistics planners to leverage all options. 
Using an alternative port like Ponce can deconflict any normal TEUs from HA TEUs, 
however the results in this study are relative to an external carrier’s ability to bring the 
port online and sustain a competitive operations tempo.  
Encourage businesses to prepare and rehearse a post disaster recovery plan to normalize 
operations as fast as possible after a disaster. Customer availability was shown to have a 
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large impact on the TEU surge duration across the system. Getting businesses back online 
and ready to receive freight will help unblock masses of TEUs stuck at the port. This 
research shows that an investment in preparation for commercial entities has a direct 
impact on post-disaster distribution and the ultimate length of the response phase. 
Recommendations for the Global Humanitarian Community 
 For the humanitarian response community, it is important to remember that when 
surging aid into an isolated region, the total available system capacity must be 
recognized. Additionally, aid shipments should be divided to reflect market realities. A 
knowledge of which carriers are available, the general unit market share breakdown, and 
post-disaster carrier effectiveness will assist in carrier selection. Throughput is enhanced 
when the total system capacity is leveraged and customer availability to receive 
shipments is quickly restored. 
Future Research 
 The feasibility of Ponce as an alternative shipping location requires additional 
research. Interviews should be conducted with local industry representatives to 
understand all facets of operations in the area. The time and cost required to bring the 
port online should be analyzed and compared to the time and cost of using pre-existing 
commercial carriers in the region. Recruited vessels and carriers will need to be 
compatible with Ponce’s infrastructure and resource conditions. 
 The distribution of HA TEUs on land after initial delivery from the sea-ports is 
another area of future research. The scope of all the research conducted in this thesis, 
only covers the first black arrow in Figure 10. That includes all TEUs sent from FEMA to 
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the Federal Staging Areas. TEUs arrive at the Federal Staging Areas (FSA) after being 
trucked out of the port. Once TEUs arrive at the FSAs, aid is unloaded from the TEUs, 
organized, prioritized, and reloaded into different trucks for onward movement. After the 
FSAs there are Regional Staging Areas (RSA) where ownership of the aid is handed off 
from the federal to the state level. After the RSAs, aid is prioritized again and 
redistributed to the Points of Delivery (POD) where the aid is delivered to the disaster 
victims. A large network of land distribution could be modeled into the current 
simulation, however sufficient data could not be obtained.  
 
Figure 10.  Example Federal Aid Distribution Chain 
Limitations 
 The simulation was built on estimates from interviewees. No hard data was 
acquired that specified exactly when each container arrived and how much. Interviews 
were held with CEOs, vice presidents, commanders, port authority directors, and FEMA 
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logisticians. Their estimates informed the model. However, the researcher was unable to 
acquire exact data which would have added an element of preciseness to the model. 
 As mentioned in the future research, the trucking network was not modeled after 
the Federal Staging Areas (FSA). This was due to the lack of unified representation for 
the trucking industry in Puerto Rico. The trucking industry is very divided and 
independently owned. There was no union or collective representative that was available 
during the interview timeframe to provide additional data. The trucking network on 
Puerto Rico in itself is complex and essential to the delivery of aid. There are potentially 
many more untapped lessons learned if the trucking network were researched further. 
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Appendix A – Data Collection Agenda 
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Appendix B – Simulation Logic 
The port of Jacksonville, Florida (JAX) was contacted by phone and email to 
request a specific query from their shipping database. They were unable to fulfill the 
request and referred the researcher to an outside company for data reporting called IHS 
Markit. IHS Markit provided a price quote for nine months of cargo data, from June of 
2017 to February of 2018, covering exports to Puerto Rico and imports from Puerto Rico 
to the port of JAX with shipment vessel names, metric tons, and shipping container 
twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). Unfortunately, the price point was well beyond the 
available funding for this research, so average figures for the simulation data input were 
obtained based on the responses of the interviewees instead. The inability to obtain the 
raw data is noted as a limitation of this study for preciseness in the simulation model. 
The FEMA Puerto Rico Logistics team scheduled meetings with available 
contacts during the week of 3-Dec-2017 to 7-Dec-2017. Contacts who were unavailable 
for meetings were not able to provide input on the simulation model. For those who were 
available for meetings, a three foot by four foot print out of the simulation model was 
prepared in advance and presented during the meetings to guide discussions for model 
corrections and to gather available data for input to the model. The simulation model will 
be discussed at length later in this chapter. The researcher flew out from Ohio to Puerto 
Rico to meet with the FEMA Puerto Rico team and to lead meetings with each of the 
scheduled parties. The meetings were held in a conference room within the FEMA 
operating facility in the city of Guaynabo each day. Organizations were scheduled to 
meet at different times and days. Each group had their own block of time, no overlap with 
other interviewees, and no one else to compete with during discussions. All interviews 
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were conducted in person and with two FEMA Puerto Rico Logistics team members: 
Jose-Rivera Solis and Derek “Doc” Abbott. The FEMA employees took their own 
personal notes, welcomed each group of interviewees, and added their own questions 
during the interviews. The loose structure of the meetings created a relaxing atmosphere 
where the interviewees were able to share as much or as little as they wanted. The FEMA 
team was already acquainted with most of the interviewees due to the working 
relationship FEMA has with the stakeholders already on the island of Puerto Rico. Notes 
were taken of each interview by the researcher and both FEMA representatives 
previously mentioned. Contact information was acquired for each interviewee for follow 
up questions. The visit to Puerto Rico included a tour of the port of San Juan and the 
Crowley shipping yards, to validate the simulation model and clarify remaining questions 
in the process. Notes were assimilated each night after the meetings and categorized into 
a table to compare values.  
Creation nodes are depicted as irregular pentagons in ARENA. After creation, HA 
entities then enter a decision node, depicted as a diamond, that is set to route a specified 
percentage of the HA to the four delivery routes constructed in the model. The four 
delivery routes are via TOTE, Trailer Bridge, Crowley, or by an external carrier through 
the port of Ponce. The decision node for carrier selection is used as a throttle that is 
adjusted differently for the individual simulation scenarios.  
To model the change in normal freight demand, two more creation nodes were 
added to each carrier. One called “normal surge” to inject additional normal freight into 
each carrier’s portion of the simulation that simulates the 45% total freight increase, 
which starts at the same time as the HA cargo and shuts off after 3 weeks. The next 
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creation node added was called “normal recovery” which likewise injects additional 
normal freight to simulate the 20% total freight increase into each carrier and acts like 
normal surge but begins when normal surge ends. “Normal” in this context simply refers 
to a TEU that is not HA cargo; in other words, it is destined for one of the regular 
customers that the respective carrier deals with regularly. 
The base model allocates 100% of the HA TEUs to Crowley.  Given FEMA’s 
strategy to surge HA cargo during a disaster to avert true humanitarian catastrophes 
(Goentzel et al., 2017), the interarrival rate for the HA TEUs within the simulation were 
given an exponential distribution. The containers are then processed using a standardized 
port processing time (PPT) derived from interview responses that is sufficient to maintain 
a steady state of cargo throughput from the recovery phase indefinitely. PPTs were 
reported to allow a barge to be downloaded within 4 hours. Since there is no data 
available regarding the internal processes of the carriers, a PPT of 0.012308 hours with 
one simulation resource was designed and generalized across the ports. The generalized 
PPT is calculated by dividing the 4 hours required to download a vessel by the 325 TEUs 
on the vessel. The resulting number provides how long it takes to process each container. 
These numbers are based on responses from Trailer Bridge, who was willing to share 
specifically how long it takes for them to offload vessels. After completing the JAX PPT, 
entities progress to a following queue for batching onto a barge or ship. The number of 
containers that can be carried on each of the vessels, the number of vessels available, and 
the speed of the vessels is relative to each carrier as reported in the interviews. 
After the entities are batched for shipment, they either continue from the first 
diamond in the model from left to right to the upper track with the pre-hurricane normal 
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number of vessels available for processing and transit times or get rerouted to a different 
processing node on the lower track that has the increased number of vessels available. 
The increased number of vessels allows for more batches of TEUs to be processed 
simultaneously. The entities are rerouted to the increased fleet size based on a conditional 
event where a variable within the system is changed from zero to one. A switch basically, 
flips at a specified time and reroutes all entities to the increased fleet size processing 
nodes with their added vessel resources available for processing more batches of entities. 
In either transit process through normal fleet sizes or increased fleet sizes, the duration of 
travel time is relative to the type of vessel used.  
 Once entities complete their travel time through the western Atlantic Ocean from 
JAX to the port of San Juan in Puerto Rico, there is a second conditional event where all 
cargo is rerouted to a holding node when the hurricane is triggered within the simulation. 
A switch is flipped that lasts for 48 hours on 20 Sep-2017 of the simulation to represent 
the passing of Hurricane Maria over the island. During this time all container traffic 
aboard ships and on delivery trucks is halted temporarily. The seaports open after the 48 
hours pass, since the carriers all commented that they were relatively unaffected at the 
ports and were able to resume operations within hours of the hurricane clearing.  
Entities are unbatched or offloaded from vessels upon arrival in Puerto Rico and 
are processed onto trucks for delivery. The rate of processing for the Puerto Rican side 
for vessel offload and truck onload, mirrors that of the JAX side for truck offload and 
vessel onload as previously mentioned to maintain the steady state across the simulation. 
Once TEUs are in-processed at the port, there is another conditional event that activates 
after the hurricane begins regarding customer availability. All of the interviewees 
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commented on the degraded ability of customers to receive their cargo after the 
hurricane. As mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2 of this research, the reduced customer 
availability was the result of several factors. Power outages translated into an inability for 
stores to maintain refrigerated cargo. Fuel shortages reduced the number of deliveries that 
could be completed and created the risk of drivers getting stranded without a refuel. 
Warehouses were damaged leaving inventory vulnerable to security threats. Given the 
accumulation of factors working against business immediately after the hurricane to 
receive their ordered cargo, inventory levels at the ports began to swell. The ports were 
being used as a temporary satellite storage facility by the consignees or customers until 
they were back online and ready to receive their shipments. To model this, a conditional 
event was created that filters a percentage of cargo out of the delivery stream and 
penalizes it with a 24-hour delay. The penalized cargo is then returned to the stream and 
re-enters the same filter for a chance of consecutive penalties or being allowed to pass 
through to the delivery trucks for onward movement to the destination. A specific 
percentage of available businesses after the hurricane passes as a data point was not 
found. Instead, the model was tuned until inventory levels in the port swelled to at least 
2000-3000 containers awaiting transport, which was indicated as a salient characteristic 
of the historical event from interview responses. It was found that filtering and penalizing 
60% of the cargo for two weeks yielded the inventory swell in the port that was described 
by interviewees. In other words, 40% of the containers were able to pass through to the 
customers, and 60% were retained at the port to simulate the bulk of customers who were 
unable to receive their cargo immediately after the disaster. After two weeks all cargo is 
released to the trucks to await available resources for transportation. The percentage of 
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TEUs filtered and penalized is also used as a throttle that can be adjusted for testing 
purposes in the model. 
 Once TEU entities clear the customer availability event, they are then processed 
onto trucks for delivery. Another significant delay reported in the interviews referenced 
the temporary road closures that resulted from the hurricane’s wake. Trees, powerlines, 
and mudslides in particular, disrupted or completely obstructed many parts of the island’s 
roadways. During one interview, a Puerto Rican Guard member commented on how it 
took him 4 days to report in to work after the hurricane, simply because he was chain 
sawing trees or shoveling mudslides that obstructed the roadways between his home and 
his location of employment (Green, 2018). Discussions with the Puerto Rican Guard unit 
representative and FEMA employees during the meetings concluded that main roadways 
were cleared about 24-48 hours after the hurricane passed. 48 hours after the hurricane 
passes through the system, all entities are released from this holding cell to continue 
onward movement to trucks.  
A one-hour delivery time was used across all carriers for truck delivery. Business 
delivery distances were approximately 20 minutes from the port of San Juan. This 
estimate was derived from a 20 minutes approximate delivery distance, plus drop off time 
of 20 minutes with the customer, and the return trip of another 20 minutes. The trucking 
industry was found during this case study to be lacking any sort of formal representation 
or unified organization. Trucking networks in Puerto Rico are based on a “I know a guy” 
network that is relative to each business who has established relationships with their 
regular business partners. The delivery process node is simply a one-hour delay for TEUs 
that pass through, which increases the total time an entity is in the system. Once an entity 
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passes through the delivery node, it has completed its journey through the entire system 
and is disposed on the far-right side of the model. 
 Crowley coordinated and opened an alternate holding area for HA cargo in a 
stadium in the city of Bayamon. The Bayamon stadium received all containers directly 
from the Crowley yard as they came off vessels in the port of San Juan. Since the HA 
cargo traversing the Crowley yard was competing with normal cargo for resources such 
as stacker cranes, HA TEU entities were given a priority within the model so that they are 
always processed first before normal cargo when the system has the option between the 
two within a queue. Bayamon was opened shortly after the hurricane passed, and thus a 
modification to the standard Crowley TEU routing model was added. A series of decision 
nodes are presented to the entities that ask whether or not Bayamon is open. If Bayamon 
is open, then another question is asked whether the entity passing through is a normal 
TEU. If it is a normal TEU then it continues on the upper normal track for truck 
processing to customers. If the TEU is not normal, or in other words HA cargo, then the 
TEU is routed to the lower track where the HA containers are processed for onward 
movement to Bayamon with priority over normal containers. A transit time delay to 
Bayamon of 30 minutes is added similar in similar fashion to the transit delays added for 
normal cargo to their destinations. The 30 minutes was determined based on the actual 
drive time distances quoted in the interviews.  
As entities pass through the assignment nodes within the simulation, incremental 
changes occur in the variables. For example, when a normal TOTE TEU enters the 
system into TOTE’s cargo flow, the TEU entity immediately passes through a node 
called “Increase TOTE inventory” that increases the variable “TOTE inventory” by one. 
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As that same entity is shipped and then offloaded from its vessel in the simulated Puerto 
Rico section, the entity passes through another node called “TOTE increase deliverable 
TEU count” that increases the “TOTE deliverable” variable by one. The deliverable 
variables represent the total number of deliverable containers on island in Puerto Rico by 
carrier. As the container entity is loaded, trucked, and exits the simulation there is one 
last change in the variables that decreases the TOTE inventory and TOTE deliverable 
variables each by one. Crowley refers to the carrier, TB refers to the carrier Trailer 
Bridge, Ponce refers to an alternate routing for HA entities through the south port of 
Ponce by an external carrier, JAX refers to the total inventory across all carriers at the 
port of JAX, and Bayamon refers to the HA entities that pass through the simulated 
Bayamon yard that branches as an extension from Crowley’s terminal. 
The system switches are binary and used to activate and deactivate certain 
features within the model. Switches are used to open Bayamon for Crowley, increase 
fleet sizes after the hurricane, and delay entities in vessels on the water, awaiting 
customer availability, and for road closures. They are activated by creating entities at a 
specified simulation date, similar to other creation nodes previously mentioned, using an 
expression. An example of the entity creation time expression to start the hurricane would 
be: “CalDateToBaseTime(2017,9,20)”, where one entity is created at a start date of 20-
Sep-2017 within the simulation’s calendar. 
A second set of variables in the model capture the number of containers in queue 
at a given time in each of the four main queues of each carrier’s respective entity flow. 
Four queues for each of the four carriers and Ponce total to 16. The major queues for each 
carrier include: the number of containers waiting in the queue for processing into batches 
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in JAX, number in queue for loading onto vessels, number in queue for unloading from 
vessels, and the number in queue for loading onto trucks. 
As the variables fluctuate within the simulation, a system of recorders was 
designed to read the pulse of the model using the variables for model validation. The 
recorders were activated by an entity that would pass through each node. As the entity 
passes through, the node is triggered to record the current value of the given variable at 
the time of the entities passing. The values are recorded into an excel file which can then 
be reviewed after simulation completion. The entities created for recording variables 
were set to flow once per day so as to obtain a daily recording of all values.  
As HA TEUs enter the route to Ponce they are subject to the same standardized 
PPT used for the other carriers to get through JAX, and then they are subject to a 
transportation fleet size and speed equivalent to that of Trailer Bridge. The fleet sizing 
and operations of Trailer Bridge seemed comparable to what would likely be used out of 
Ponce. After arriving in Puerto Rico via Ponce the TEUs again pass through an 
equivalent PPT and truck loading times. One notable feature that is removed from the 
Ponce flow is that of customer availability. Since HA is not concerned with a regular 
business customer, it is not penalized like normal cargo that has to wait for businesses to 
re-open. Instead, HA is trucked directly to Federal Staging Areas (FSA) where federal 
employees re-establish accountability of the goods and coordinate transfer of HA 
supplies to the state government. The entities in the Ponce flow are subject to the same 
delays as the carriers while traveling across the water and roads.  
 Using the read write function in ARENA daily queue lengths were recorded for 
each of the four major processing points in the model: port processing at JAX, batched 
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processing onto vessels for transit, unbatched processing off of vessels into San Juan, and 
final container processing onto trucks for delivery. These four processing points in the 
timeline are multiplied by the four routes a container may take to reach Puerto Rico, 
which is via Crowley, TOTE Maritime, Trailer Bridge, or via a fourth external shipper 
using the port of Ponce. The number of containers or entities in queue for each of the 16 
queues were recorded daily and exported to an excel sheet. Those queue lengths for the 
duration of the 12-week simulation were then averaged across the 25 replications of each 
simulation. The resulting 25 replication averages over 12 weeks were plotted in multiple 
ways and used for the initial analysis. 
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Screenshot of the full ARENA model
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Appendix C – ARENA Output 
Averages across the 25 replications are used. For example, a data point for a given 
day is the average of that data point on that day across the 25 replications. 
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System Number Out 46640.16 76259.32 76261.32 75216.24 76054.72 76258.92 76258.36 76260.04 73919.68
Sum of weighted avg VA time
by units entering 104.6543 113.442 113.3151 111.5444 110.9228 113.3765 126.7899 107.8709 114.055
by units leaving 104.2268 113.1669 113.0366 110.7488 110.6672 113.102 126.4374 107.6284 113.1325
Sum of weighted avg Wait time
by units entering 48.70497 127.945 127.5569 120.8028 110.9127 132.1707 175.4955 119.6115 119.1905
by units leaving 48.81755 128.2289 128.028 119.5831 111.0187 132.5065 175.5228 119.9935 108.3514
Sum of weighted avg Total time
by units entering 153.3593 241.387 240.872 232.3472 221.8355 245.5472 302.2855 227.4824 233.2455
by units leaving 153.0444 241.3958 241.0646 230.3319 221.686 245.6085 301.9602 227.622 221.4839
Sum of avg entities
entering system 50425 80489 80489 80489 80489 80489 80489 80489 80489
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in work 3686.17 9280.597 9268.155 8880.375 8524.435 9439.744 11568.87 8760.198 9484.651
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Resource instantaneous utilization sum of averages
excluding Ponce 5.275415 7.818928 7.430721 7.428722 7.473018 7.816312 7.819255 7.817214 6.719297
including Ponce 8.117624
Resource number busy sum of averages
excluding Ponce 9.361345 15.98637 15.59517 15.00147 15.11578 15.98386 15.98528 15.98395 13.5951
including Ponce 14.99343
Resource scheduled usage utilization sum of averages
excluding Ponce 5.275415 7.818928 7.430721 7.428722 7.473018 7.816312 7.819255 7.817214 6.719297
including Ponce 8.117624
Resource total seized sum of averages
excluding Ponce 143704 240249.1 233008.4 230980.4 232730.6 240247.4 240259.3 240249.8 209123.2
including Ponce 228339.2
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